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My report will use the 2009 Guadeloupean strikes as an ethnographic moment 
that reveals the complex intersection of race, culture, and nationality in the construction 
of Guadeloupean identity.  The strikes created an environment that made even more 
visible the strategic negotiations of identity that are important to understanding 
postcolonial relationships between intimately tied nations such as Guadeloupe, Haiti, and 
France.  I argue that Antillean identity is constructed along a racial continuum as 
represented by the racio-cultural extremes of Haiti and metropolitan France.  Depending 
on the agenda—whether socio-cultural, economic, political, or any combination of the 
three—in politicized situations, Antilleans will highlight categories that allow for them to 
maximize their various, fluid positions as non-sovereign Caribbeans, as second-class 
French citizens, and as members of the Black diaspora with racial politics that have a 
complicated relationship to Blackness.  By looking at how certain categories are 
manipulated, we can also develop a better understanding of—and even strategies for—
relieving the tensions that, I believe, undermine racial and cultural cooperation for these 
under-researched communities in France and its territories.   
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I had no idea that the strikes were happening until I saw the Facebook status of a close 
friend state that she was “so proud of my people! Gwadloup’ sé tan nou é pa ta yo!!! 
[Guadeloupe is ours, not theirs!]”  On the phone, her excitement was palpable as she 
talked about the strikes’ potential to bring about essential socio-economic and cultural 
changes to the island.  The labor collective behind the strikes listed over a hundred 
demands, ranging from pay increases to kréyol language education, but their variety and 
quantity told another story.  The demands’ wide range called attention to the multiple 
concerns of a broad section of Guadeloupe’s population—the people’s desire to have 
more control over their economy, more employment opportunities, better political 
representation, better and more historically-targeted education, and active preservation of 
their culture.  The tackling of these concerns, I contend, are affected by the constant play 
of identity politics.   
Guadeloupe’s current problems are directly related to France’s history of slavery 
and colonial domination in the Caribbean.  France began their Caribbean colonial empire 
in 1625 with the establishment of a settlement in French Guiana.  In a few decades, 
France had expanded to the islands of Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Guadeloupe, Martinique, 
and Saint Domingue.  French rule, similar to that of other colonial powers, established a 
strict racial hierarchization that was reinforced through the structure of the plantation, and 
then later codified by le code noir (the black code), a set of laws instituted in 1685 by 
King Louis XIV.  The code was used to define the conditions of slavery and citizenship 
for those on the islands who were enslaved, freed, or born of mixed race parentage.  At 
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the top of the hierarchy were the white colonists, who were divided into two groups: the 
grand blancs and the petit blancs, although (collectively) these groups were known on 
the islands as békés.  The grand blancs (grand békés) were the rich landowners and 
officers, and the petit blancs (béké gouyans) were merchants and artisans, descendants of 
European indentured servants (les engagés) with lower status and less wealth.  The mixed 
race population (mûlatres or gens de couleurs1) grew in spite of anti-miscegenation laws, 
and especially in the smaller colonies that had a lower ratio of white colonists to enslaved 
Africans.  The gens de couleurs were viewed as an in-between group, excluded from full 
civic participation, yet offered privileges denied to enslaved Africans.   
The French Revolution, which led to a period of social upheaval that questioned 
the conditions of citizenship and rights, intensified the debate around slavery.  
Abolitionists in mainland France became more vocal as a number of slave revolts erupted 
in the French colonies.  And although white plantation owners feared losing their labor 
force, the government in the metropole  abolished slavery in 1794.  This was done in part 
to maintain the allegiance of the gens de couleurs as well as to potentially gain new, 
productive nationals from the newly freed Africans (Dubois 2004a).  Soon thereafter, 
however, pressure from the white colonists and mainland investors in the colonies 
convinced French leader Napoleon Bonaparte to work towards reinstating slavery in the 
colonies.  When freed Africans in Guadeloupe and Saint Domingue heard rumors that 
                                                
1 As defined by Laurent Dubois, “this ‘intermediate’ category between free whites and 
the enslaved was made up of those of African descent who were no longer enslaved.  
Many, but not all, in this group also had some European ancestry.  Although their liberty 
guaranteed them many of the legal rights denied to the slaves, they were also subject to a 
battery of discriminatory legislation” (Dubois 2004: 54).  I will expand on their particular 
situation in the following chapter. 
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they would be re-enslaved, they organized revolts against the French troops sent to the 
island to regain control (DuBois 2004a).  By 1802, the French army had defeated the 
enslaved Blacks who had organized, although resistance movements continued after the 
suicide of Louis Delgrès, the lead general.  Only Saint Domingue managed to overthrow 
France in 1803.  The victory of Saint Domingue, newly rechristened Haiti, was a 
significant turning point for the future of the Caribbean, both for the relationship of the 
other Antillean colonies with both France and Haiti.  In particular, “united for years in a 
Republican project of slave emancipation and all-out war against the British, the islands 
of Haiti and Guadeloupe would follow two completely different paths during the next 
centuries” (Dubois 2004a: 320).  “Where Haiti charted a difficult course as an 
independent nation, Guadeloupe remained—as it remains to today—part of France,” 
argued historian Laurent Dubois (ibid.).  
Historical accounts of the Caribbean post-Haitian-revolution reveal that unity 
between the islands—i.e. Haiti and the  rest of the Antilles—declined while relations with 
other nations became more pronounced (Gaspar and Geggus 1997).   Slavery in France’s 
colonies was officially abolished on March 4, 1848, but in order to compensate for the 
large number of freed Africans who left the plantations to work in the service sector, the 
government sponsored a program in the late 1800s to bring in farm laborers from the East 
Indies.  The majority went to Guadeloupe.  The introduction of an East Indian labor force 
exacerbated racial and class tensions on the island: the black population felt that the East 
Indians were undercutting their labor power, while white planters fought to maintain their 
steady stream of contract labor (Schnepel 2004).  The French government eventually 
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ended the migrant program, but the East Indian presence on the island complicated the 
raced-based class hierarchy, as they were pitted against the black population and even 
used as strike breakers by French industries.  At the same time, many assimilated and 
created families with the local white and mixed-race population.   
The socio-economic and racial struggles in Guadeloupe and the rest of the 
Antilles also yielded cultural responses.  A prominent one was the Negritude movement 
which emerged in the early 1930s, led by Francophone Antilleans, Aimé Césaire and 
Léon Damas, and West African Léopold Senghor.  Negritude was a cultural response to a 
sense of alienation and fragmentation that emerged from France’s policy of cultural 
assimilation.  This policy is related to the ideology of French republicanism, which is 
premised on the political and cultural unity of the state.  France permitted anyone (in 
theory, at least) to become French citizens, provided that they became culturally French 
as well.  This in itself was premised on the belief of the superiority of the French (and 
Western) culture and civilization.  The Negritude movement, in turn, celebrated African 
civilization, and sought to re-establish a black identity while rejecting cultural 
assimilation (Lewis 2006; Wilder 2005; Monro 2004).  Haiti served as an inspiration for 
(psychological) revolt and identity, particularly for the Martinican Césaire and the 
Guyanese Damas.  Césaire asserts Haiti as where “Negritude first stood up” (Césaire 
1939: 24), referring to the Haitian revolution.  Moreover, the 1915-1934 American 
occupation of Haiti helped foment a major literary and artistic proliferation around 
“Haitianism”—Haitian cultural pride—that heavily influenced the Antillean scholars.  In 
particular, Dumas was profoundly influenced by Haitian scholar Jean Price-Mars, who 
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sought to affirm Haiti’s African roots and criticized the Eurocentric attitudes and 
behavior of the elite (Munro 2004).  As cited by Munro, “Damas concludes that 
Negritude is not an introverted, racially exclusive movement, but has essentially 
universality aims, and that it owes this fundamental aspect of its vision ultimately to 
Price-Mars” (Munro 2004: 6).  Although Haiti was not directly involved in the Negritude 
movement, the country set a precedent for Black cultural pride that inspired generations.     
The shift from colony to departmentalization of Guadeloupe (and Martinique, 
French Guiana, and the Reunion), however, caused profound shifts in the engagement 
with Negritude while spurring debates about the merits of French cultural assimilation.  
Departmentalization—the legal absorption of France’s colonies into the French political 
and administrative systems in 1946—was meant to guarantee equal rights for people of 
color.   Furthermore, it was a guarantee of economic security—and for the elite, political 
legitimacy (Beriss 2004)—in order, as some would argue, to avoid the fate of the 
independent Caribbean nation of Haiti.  Yet among other issues, departmentalization 
caused an increase in migration from other nations, including Syria, Lebanon, Dominica, 
and Haiti.  While the Syrian-Lebanese and to a lesser extent Dominicans worked their 
way up the socio-economic ladder, Haitians formed an under-class, generally involved in 
low-skilled, low-wage labor (Schnepel 2004; Brodwin 2001). The persistence of race-
based socio-economic stratification in Guadeloupe, with white descendants of colonist, or 
békés at the top, mixed-raced, Middle Eastern and East Indians forming the middle class, 
and blacks at the bottom, would greatly impact Haitian immigrants, contributing to 
continued discrimination and marginalization.  This marginalization was further 
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compounded by Haitian immigrants’ different linguistic, cultural, and religious 
practices—all of which, when linked to Haiti’s revolutionary history, led to the people’s 
hyperracialization and resultant scorn and exclusion.    
Indeed, it is this rejection of Haiti’s kind of “blackness” that the Negritude 
movement sought to challenge.  Its limitation, however, was its emphasis on Africa as the 
root of Caribbean identity—a focus that, many believed, de-emphasized the history of 
hybridity in the Caribbean that was fundamental to its formation.  Glissant’s notion of 
Antillanité, featuring a decentered, fragmented, and contradictory subject is what allows 
for the Guadeloupean to deploy a range of identities to its ultimate advantage.  As 
Michael Dash eloquently summarizes, “Glissant sees the world and the Caribbean in 
particular in terms of an intricate branching of communities, an infinite wandering across 
cultures, where triumphs are momentary and where adaptation and métissage 
(creolization) are the prevailing forces” (Dash 1989: xxviii).  Yet in this complex 
formulation of Caribbean identity one’s blackness is diffused as the creolized and mixed 
Caribbean becomes a privileged site of identity over the Negritude’s  Black-based 
relationship between Africa and the Caribbean.   
My report will use the 2009 Guadeloupean strikes as an ethnographic moment 
that reveals the complex intersection of race, culture, and nationality in the construction 
of Guadeloupean identity.  The strikes created an environment that made even more 
visible the strategic negotiations of identity that are important to understanding 
postcolonial relationships between intimately tied nations such as Guadeloupe, Haiti, and 
France.  I argue that Antillean identity is constructed along a racial continuum as 
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represented by the racio-cultural extremes of Haiti and metropolitan France.  Depending 
on the agenda—whether socio-cultural, economic, political, or any combination of the 
three—in politicized situations, Antilleans will highlight categories that allow for them to 
maximize their various, fluid positions as non-sovereign Caribbeans, as second-class 
French citizens, and as members of the Black diaspora with racial politics that have a 
complicated relationship to Blackness.  By looking at how certain categories are 
manipulated, we can also develop a better understanding of—and even strategies for—
relieving the tensions that, I believe, undermine racial and cultural cooperation for these 
under-researched communities in France and its territories.   
For this report, I will describe the context and events surrounding the 2009 
strikes, focusing mostly on the island of Guadeloupe, where the strikes first originated. 
Inflated gas prices, the tipping point for the strikes, was a relatively banal issue compared 
with the centuries-long struggle against the exploitation of the Antilles, a point upon 
which I will further elaborate upon in the third chapter.  I will highlight the instances 
when tropes of race and culture were used explicitly to distinguish the Antilleans from 
those they labeled as Other, such as in the slogan of the strikes, “Gwadloup sé tan nou é 
pa ta yo” (Guadeloupe is ours and not theirs).  I hope to demonstrate that Guadeloupean’s 
tricky political and economic ties to France challenge the potency of the nationalist and 
seemingly separatist sentiments engendered by the strikes.  Moreover, the racial tensions 
that were intensified by the strikes speak to the broader discussion on race and global 
racial formation.  The stratification of Guadeloupean society along race and class and the 
presence of not only a powerful white minority elite but also a socially powerful middle-
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class bourgeoisie class made up of predominantly lighter-skinned Guadeloupeans also 
calls into question the color-line.  As Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot 
points out, “color-cum-social categories operate in various spheres of urban life as part of 
different strategies of competition and struggle” (Trouillot 1998: 146).  These categories 
operate on a global scale, and affect relationships between and among the African 
diaspora.  In my conclusion I will address the implications of the strikes in community 






The tipping point was gas prices.  People around the world watched in shock as the price 
of oil climbed to $150 a barrel in 2008, causing gas prices to skyrocket.  Following the 
law of supply and demand, the demand for oil decreased as the prices went up, but as the 
economy weakened further, oil prices eventually began to go down, causing a dramatic 
decrease in the price of gas as well.  France’s overseas departments, however, were still 
paying inflated prices (Pierot, L’Humanite 2009: January 29).  This caused a general 
sense of outrage across the islands.  Given their already difficult economic position, it 
would soon fuel large-scale anger and protest.   
 
Departmentalization and its Discontents 
 
The strikes were a response to a problem caused in great part by the 
departmentalization of France’s Caribbean possessions. After the abolition of slavery in 
1848, newly freed Africans left the plantations, leaving white plantation owners in a 
panic.  They sought government help, and in 1854 France stepped in and started a 
migrant labor program, bringing in indentured servants from China, parts of Africa, the 
Portuguese territories, with the largest group from India (Schnepel 2004).  This new 
migrant population, later known as “coolies”, offered a temporary economic respite for 
the plantation owners.  However, in 1884, Guadeloupe was hit by a sugar crisis.  The 
competition from European beet sugar growers caused a sudden drop in sugar prices on 
the European market and many plantations were forced to close or sell to larger 
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companies (Lara 2006).  France ended the indentured servants program in 1885, with the 
last boat docking in 1889.  Guadeloupe was still facing an economic crisis, and thus 
expanded its crop market to better suit the European market.  Planters began growing 
bananas, pineapples, and rice.  The sugar crisis revealed how deeply intertwined the 
economy of Guadeloupe was tied France’s success or failure.     
As the economy struggled to right itself, the Guadeloupean society was also 
facing some major changes.  Of the East Indian workers Schnepel writes 
“Industrious in nature and often maintaining good relations with their white 
superiors, East Indian workers challenged the black labor force and effectively 
split the working-class ranks...by their very concentration in the agricultural 
industry where they performed tasks, such as cutting cane, which blacks refused 
to do, East Indians replaced blacks as the lowest esteemed group. Thus indirectly 
the group may have favored the social ascendancy of blacks into other sectors of 
activity” (Schnepel 2004: 46).   
 
This “model minority” status may have served to their advantage when they eventually 
gained citizenship rights in 1923.  Following this victory, many of them found jobs in the 
service industry, as merchants and bus drivers for example, thus gaining middle class 
status and fully assimilating to Guadeloupean life.  Guadeloupe faced other challenges as 
well, as the socialist movement gained prominence in France and the Antilles.  Socialist 
labor union leaders such as Achille René-Boisneuf and Hégésippe Légitimus began 
questioning the marginalized political status of Guadeloupeans, calling for more 
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economic justice between the factories and their workers and for political equality as full 
French citizens.   
 World War II was a significant turning point for Guadeloupe.  The war caused the 
French economy to suffer, especially under the Nazi Vichy regime, and since the Antilles 
were dependent on France’s economy, Guadeloupe was in turn devastated (Fransee 
2007).  The island remained afloat through self-sufficiency and autonomous efforts, and 
after the war ended, more politicians called for the decolonization of the Antilles, 
including Aimé Césaire.  Césaire was one of the founders of Negritude, “the colonized 
response to cultural oppression by the French” where “the destruction of cultural 
assimilation was a prerequisite to the quest for black identity” (Lewis 2006: 27).  Yet he 
advocated for the political integration of the Caribbean colonies in hopes that it would 
lead toward colonial emancipation without national independence (Wilder 2009).  
Césaire’s advocacy of departmentalization was still in line with his ideology of 
Negritude.  Césaire rejected cultural assimilation as it pertained to the French culture and 
its suppression of black cultures, but still believed in the potential of French Caribbean 
colonies to equal and treated fairly under French law.  Furthermore, Césaire hoped 
departmentalization—or the political and economic assumption of France’s oldest 
colonies French bureaucracy—would lead to more economic autonomy, and break up the 
industries owned by white French colonists and their descendants, known as the békés.  
Departmentalization entailed bringing Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, and La 
Reunion up to the same governmental level as France’s mainland departments. 
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Unfortunately, departmentalization bought with it new challenges in governing. 
While there was an increase in the standard-of-living as a result of the rapid switch from 
a plantation to a service-based economy, departmentalization brought with it a number of 
issues, concisely laid out by anthropologist David Beriss: 
“First, by bringing the Antilles in line with French social legislation, labor 
costs have risen dramatically since the 1940s.  Couples with growing competition 
for European markets by tropical products from African and Latin American 
countries, most of the Antillean plantations could no longer compete.  At the same 
time, departmentalization has brought with it the implantation of large French 
bureaucracies to administer social services.  By 1980, nearly 30 percent and city 
hall in Fort-de-France was reputed to be the island’s biggest employer, surpassing 
the sugar producers in total employees” (Beriss 2004: 60).  
 
The cost of living in the overseas departments (also known as département d’outre mer, 
or DOMs) became significantly higher than in the French metropole, in large part due to 
the irregular taxation system: France’s policy was to “favor as much as possible exports 
[from mainland France] including subsidizing them, and restrict as much as possible 
imports [from overseas] through taxation” (Numa 2009: 34).2  The lack of revenue from 
economic exchanges with France made it very difficult to establish trading relationships 
with other islands in the Caribbean.  On the island, tensions existed between the local 
                                                
2 “…Favoriser autant que possible les exportation y compris en subventionnnant, et 
resteindre autant que possible les importation en taxant.” All translations are mine unless 
otherwise noted.   
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black population and the békés.  Béké families were acquiring ever-larger portions of the 
islands’ wealth.  Although béké families make up less than 1% of the island’s population, 
they dispropionately own 52% of the farming land and 40% of the major companies and 
supermarkets (Numa 2009).  With a reduction in the small-farm agricultural industry due 
to the growing béké monopoly on land, and with an overall decreased interest in manual 
labor, Guadeloupe experienced a dramatic increase in emigration since the 1960s, 
particularly for those between the ages of 18-35.  Their emigration was facilitated by the 
creation of the agency BUMIDOM (Bureau pour le développement des migration 
intéressant les département d’outre-mer-Bureau of Overseas Department Migration) in 
1962 (Schnepel 2004; Bonilla 2009).   This program eventually ended in the 80s, but the 
employment infrastructure in Guadeloupe was neglected, leading to higher unemployment 
rates.  In fact, by 2007, Guadeloupe has the second highest unemployment rate (22.7%), 




The global economic crisis had an extremely detrimental effect on the Caribbean.  
In 2007, Haiti had food riots over the rising cost of rice, a basic and important food 
staple.  Rising food costs also affected Guadeloupe, and combined with higher oil costs 
and wages lower than that of the metropole, the situation became nearly unbearable. 
On December 5, 2008, a number of labor unions, organizations and associations 
came together to plan a protest over the high cost of fuel.  After their first protest was met 
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with failure, the unions and organizations continued to meet and discussed grievances 
that went beyond fuel costs, and members discussed including seeking general 
socioeconomic justice in the form of more affordable housing, lower food prices, and 
education reform.  To achieve their goals, forty-eight various labor unions and 
organizations came together under a united platform, forming the umbrella organization 
Lyannaj Kont Pwofitasyon (Collective Against Extreme Exploitation-LKP), declaring “we 
are together in a movement of consciousness with engagement and determination to lift 
Guadeloupe out of its predicament”.3  LKP wrote up a list of 146 social demands of the 
French government and planned a general strike in order to have those demands met.  At 
the top of their list was “an immediate pay increase of at least 200 Euros, of low-income 
workers, retirees, and minimum wage monthly pay increase in the effort to increase 
buying power, to support local Guadeloupean products and general consumption...[and] a 
minimum Guadeloupean salary calculated based on the cost of living in Guadeloupe.”  
LKP also reiterated that the cost of living in Guadeloupe is in fact about 30% higher than 
in mainland France.   
It is important to underline that the DOMs were not seeking to adjust the prices of 
all products to reflect that of the metropole, but mostly the prices of imported products 
that were found locally, in order to provide fair market competition.  The  spokesperson 
for LKP, Élie Domota, directly addressed this issue in an interview, saying: 
“Guadeloupe has become a colony of consumption of imported products sold at 
inflated prices.  All of the legislation regarding the overseas territories these past 
                                                
3 “Nou ansanm ansanm sanblé adan on bel balan a konsyans avé angajman é 
detewminasyon pou nou détoyé Gwadloup.” 
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years obey the same logic: that of [tax] deregulation and the exoneration of 
businesses to pay certain national dues.  Lured by these gifts, entrepreneurs come 
here and fill their pockets [with money] before leaving, leaving a trail of 
unemployed workers.  These politics have permitted neither development nor 
protest for social change.  Today, the Guadeloupeans say ‘No’” (Interview with 
Rosa Moussaoui, L’Humanite 2009a: February 9). 
LKP planned their strike in two parts, beginning with the shutting down of all gas stations 
on the island on January 19th, and then expanding to a national strike the following day.  
The entire island came to a standstill: major supermarkets, businesses, banks, schools and 
universities were closed.  The LKP even occupied the international airport for a day, 
taking over check-in and baggage services and delaying the majority of flights.  With the 
support of tens of thousands of resident Guadeloupeans, the organizers demanded an 
audience with French government officials.  Several large scale protests were formally 
organized the end of January, drawing between 20,000 and 65,000 participants.  The 
protesters marched in the streets wearing red shirts, shouting and singing the official 
slogan of the protests, “Gwadloup se tan nou, sé pa ta yo, yo pé fé sa yo vlé adan péyi an 
nou” [Guadeloupe is ours, not theirs, they can’t do what they want in our country].  
“They” is overtly a reference to the béké population who, in turn, felt they were 
“scapegoated” during the protests as the root cause for the economic inequalities.  The 
tensions between the békés and the rest of the population were only exacerbated with the 
diffusion of the one-hour documentary Les Derniers Maîtres de la Martinique (The Last 
Masters of Martinque) on February 5th.  The LKP scheduled an outdoor screening as a 
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part of the strikes.  The documentary highlighted the economic power that the békés 
possessed on the island, and interviewed both békés and non-white Guadeloupeans to 
hear their opinions and attitudes on the situation in Martinique.   One Black Martinican 
interviewed told the reporter, “we are slaves. We are all slaves. Modern slaves.  Go look 
for Aubery, Hayot, de Lucy, de Reynal, Viviers: all these, they are the big békés.  It’s 
because of them that we are here!”   
The békés expressed annoyance with the protests against their presence, stating in 
matter-of-fact terms that they simply know how to effectively run businesses, and do not 
“own” the island.  Alain Huyges-Despointes, a senior béké, was blunt in his disgust for 
racial mixing (known as métissage).  He revealed that long-standing béké families were 
cast out of the béké caste once an interracial marriage occurred.  He furthermore stated he 
wanted to “preserve the race”.  While other békés lamented the fact that one person ended 
up representing the racist tendencies of the whole béké caste, their presence on the island 
and the economic privilege and power can be considered as offensive as the bigoted 
comments of Huyges-Despointes.  LKP projected the film at a nighttime rally before 
hundreds in the capital Pointe-à-Pitre and another major city, Fort-de-France.  The film’s 
harsh findings provided further incentive for protest and revolt. 
 Many békés however claim Guadeloupean identity with the same fervor as their 
Antillean neighbors, highlighting the shared cultural aspect of Guadeloupean identity in 
favor of race.  In one news interview on France 24, a béké told the reporter that 
Guadeloupe was his country too—and stated this in Guadeloupean kréyol, thus 
authenticating his identity through language.  It begs the question, what does it mean for 
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a béké to identify as Guadeloupean, a nationally racialized category?  The color-blind 
nature of French citizenship allows for the békés to generate sympathy for their 
experience of reverse discrimination.  In an ambiguously sympathetic Le Monde article 
on the small white minority population, a former leader of a business association stated: 
“We mustn’t exaggerate the importance of the békés, they only own the leftovers” 
(Gurrey and Hopquin, Le Monde 2009: March 1).  Two senior békés were also 
interviewed, and the authors did not spare details in order to cast a sympathetic light:  
“The man boxed in his humiliation, and removed his hand. He did not shield his 
face, knowing well the heavy historic debt that opposes the 3,000 békés against 
400,000 Martinicans.  His ancestor arrived on the island in 1635, as the captain of 
a militia.  He profited against the misery of slaves…’We didn’t talk about slavery 
at home.  For us, it was a burden.  But today, it’s like nothing has changed.  
Exploiter, stingy employer, racist, endogamist.’ Roger de Jaham does not 
understand the disgrace that his community is currently experiencing, [the people] 
howling for a sacrifice.  “We are scapegoats,” he suspects.  “The strikers, the 
media, and even the president of the Republic have chosen the békés as their 
targets.”  At his side, his brother Claude 65 years old, wants to believe that it’s 
only a bad moment that will eventually pass: “I think that it will go down, but in 




The term “scapegoats” was often repeated during the strikes by those who sympathized 
with the békés or the békés themselves.  The béké community resented being considered 
as a whole responsible for the social and economic misfortune of Guadeloupe.  They 
accused LKP of reverse or “anti-white” racism.  Domota dismissed the accusation of anti-
white racism as a scare tactic. Patricia Braflan-Trobo, a Guadeloupean scholar, states it 
plainly: 
Those that denounce the movement, it is a systematic political exclusion of 
Guadeloupeans of African and Indigenous origins from higher-end, specialized 
positions.  The large institutions, such as the State, are responsible for these 
processes of exclusion.  Not one of the heads of State offices is black in 
Guadeloupe, except for the director of the ANPE [National Agency for 
Employment]...All the posts of power, of decision-making, are held by white 
people.  For this fact, when a crisis erupts such as the one we just witnessed, the 
social issues intersect with racial issues, which, I insist, does not depend 
whatsoever on “anti-white racism” (Interview with Rosa Moussaoui, L’Humanité 
2009c: February 28).    
 
France was incredibly slow to respond to the crisis.  A well-known puppet-animation 
satire (in a style similar to The Onion News) called Les Guignols produced a sketch on 
the strikes that was posted on a number of blogs discussing the crisis.  Using a televised 
news format, the sketch opened up with Sarkozy’s “discovery” of the island of 
Guadeloupe, and then quickly turning away, claiming that the inhabitants looked hostile.  
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The news anchor then introduced as his “guest” the French Prime Minister François 
Fillon.  Asking him why France waited two weeks before even acknowledging the 
strikes, Fillon stated that there was no point in addressing the strikes since, “Guadeloupe 
was an island” and due to global warming, it would soon be underwater.  The segment 
then switched to a well-known conservative correspondent (again, in puppet form), who 
questioned what to do with the “savages” and calling for the revival of the lost career of 
the “pacifying Jesuit missionary” in order to civilize the island inhabitants.  The news 
anchor interviewed Sarkozy as well, asking why the delay in response, and Sarkozy 
responded, “Oh come on, Guadeloupe doesn’t interest anyone…it’s RFO…the local news 
station of the DOM-TOMs. It’s has only 50,000 viewers, you must see the 
pointlessness…RFO can wait.”  In another segment, a government worker came to see 
Sarkozy in order to inform him that Guadeloupe was striking, complaining that he 
couldn’t get his crate of “Ti-Punch” a popular rum drink from the Antilles, and without 
his apèro [drink appetizer] he couldn’t work.   
The political skit touched on a number of attitudes that the French publicly carry.  
The overseas territories are typically viewed as a tourist destination, an exotic escape in 
the Caribbean (and were billed as such in the 20th century, with the founding of Club 
Méditerranée, or Club Med for short).  Most of the gross domestic product of Martinique 
and Guadeloupe is generated through tourism.  In 2008, 86% of tourists who visited the 
DOMs (Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guyana, and the Reunion) were French (Le 
tourisme en France en 2008).  Because of this, the French are unable to see the 
departments as anything more than the exotic locale of France, a built-in resort.  The 
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French see the Antilles as a site of consumption; they enjoy the music, the food and 
alcohol, but arguably cannot see beyond the material aspects of Antillean culture.  For 
this reason, the protests could go unreported for two weeks because Antilleans are not 
viewed as French citizens on equal footing with those in mainland France, but as 
geographically, politically, and culturally distinct and less important.     
In February, two weeks after the start of the strike, the French government sent 
the Junior Minister of Overseas France, Yves Jego, to Guadeloupe to negotiate with the 
employees and strikers.  Jego sat down on February 4th with leaders of the LKP along 
with employers and business leaders and proposed a deal to increase the salaries of 
45,000 Guadeloupean workers by over 200 Euros.  Large employers in Guadeloupe said 
that they could not afford the salary increase and refused to sign any accord unless the 
French government agreed to offset the costs in some way.  Jego abruptly departed for 
Paris on February 9th, to the anger of the LKP representatives for abandoning them at a 
critical time.  When he approached Prime Minister Fillon with the conditions proposed by 
the large companies and the labor unions, Fillon rejected the accord, refusing to 
contribute more state money toward salary increases.   
 
Gwada sé tan nou! 
 
The sudden departure of Fillon prompted a lyrical response by Guadeloupeans.  It is 
important to look to music to uncover parts of Guadeloupean identity since music, 
particularly carnaval, has always played a major role in Guadeloupe’s history.  Carnaval 
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has always been a revolutionary form of music, used as a way for the enslaved to poke 
fun at their masters (Melyon-Reinette and Durpaire 2009).  The 2009 carnaval festival’s 
theme, “Le Mas4 Kont Pwofitasyon” was key in drawing in more participants to the LKP 
rallies.  Using the slogan heard from the beginning of the strikes, “Guadeloupe is ours, 
not theirs!”, songwriters Akiyo and Voukoum made both overt and subtle references to 
the various levels of the conflict. Set to a carnival beat, the song was heard everywhere, 
in homes and on the streets as strikers marched up and down.   
 
La Gwadloup sé tan nou, la Gwadloup sé pa ta yo 
Yo pé ké fè sa yo vlé, sa yo vlé an péyi an nou.     
 
[Guadeloupe is ours, Guadeloupe is not theirs 
They cannot do what they want, what they want in our country]5  
 
The song begs the question, who makes up Guadeloupe? To whom does Guadeloupe not 
belong? “Guadeloupe is ours, not theirs” forced French spectators to question the 
slogan’s meaning, which evoked France’s colonial past and current economic 
exploitation, but most importantly the racial inequality that is clearly referenced in the 
                                                
4 As explained by Melyon-Reinette and Durpaire, “Mas is one of the formes of carnval 
practiced in Guadeloupe.  Its parades are less policed than that of the Carnaval.  The 
disguises and costumes often represent political messages or permit political, identity, or 
cultural expression.  Imprinted with meaning and expressing revolt, Mas is total 
expression through the body.  The beat is quick and determined” (24).   
5 Translated by Jean Élisabeth Largitte. Lyrics taken from the website 
http://www.potomitan.info/gwadloup/la_gwadloup_se_tan_nou.php 
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“us-them” dichotomy of the slogan. The somewhat ambiguous statement allows it to 
work on multiple levels, including nationally, between the Guadeloupeans and the French 
government; and locally, between the békés and the rest of the population.  These levels 
overlap to create a complex mapping of Guadeloupean identity.  They directly attack the 
government as represented by the local prefect: 
 
Misyé préfé soti rivé, jak biswen mété difé  
I ja ka pozé veto, i vlé pran nou pou rigolo 
 
Mister Prefect, just arrived, is ready to set fire  
He opposes [our] vetoes, he takes us for fools 
 
Later on, another couplet is dedicated to the prefect: 
 
Misyé soti la i sot, i èvè nouvèl diktati 
Nou adan on démokwasi, pa menm savé sa i ka di 
Misyé préfé réfléchi, réfléchi byen sa ou ka di 
Nou vini posé ou kessyon, a vou dè ban nou bon solisyon 
 
The man came out of nowhere with a new declaration 
We are in a democracy, he has no idea what he’s talking about 
Mister Prefect, please think, think about what you declare 
23 
We came to ask you questions, it is up to you to give us the right solutions 
 
In both sections, Guadeloupeans are asking for respect as a (non-sovereign) nation, the 
right to have more control over their futures, or to at least have their futures be better 
secured.  But later on they reference their historical particularity: 
 
Mhmm Nou sé pitit a Ignas, désandan a Solitid  
Sé yo ki zansèt an nou, sé yo ki Gwadloupéyen  
I kriyé Gwadloup-la, yo goumé pou nou soti  
Alè nou ka pété chenn nou pa ka viré an ba chenn 
 
We are the children of Ignace6, descendants of Solitude7 
They are our ancestors, they are Guadeloupeans  
They named Guadeloupe, they fought for our existence  
Now we break our chains, we won’t return to chains. 
 
Here we have another reference to slavery and colonialism, and an allusion to modern-
day bondage.  The song’s last verse indirectly references race through the use of the sun: 
 
Manman la Gwadloup sé tan nou, la Gwadloup péyi an nou  
La Gwadloup sé la nou yé, la nou fèt an solèy-la  
                                                
6 Figure of the Guadeloupean uprising in the 18th century 
7 La mulâtresse Solitude (1772 - 1802 ) is a historical figure of the Guadeloupean slave 
resistance in the 18th century 
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Gwadada sé tan nou, péyi-la sé pa ta yo  
On biten fo yo konprann, yo ké lésé nou kon nou yé. 
 
Mother, Guadeloupe is ours, Guadeloupe is our country 
Guadeloupe is where we are, where we are born in the sun 
Guadeloupe is ours, the county is not theirs 
One thing they must understand, they must let us be as we are 
 
The lyrics provide insight into the complicated discourse around identity and nationality.  
Although race was never explicitly mentioned, references to chains and the sun certainly 
make it clear that Guadeloupeans have a racial consciousness that they try to reconcile 
with their national alliances.   
 
The Dénouement?  
  
Around the same time, the strike spread to neighboring Martinique.  The sister 
umbrella organization Collectif du 5 février (The February 5th Collective) held their own 
protests drawing tens of thousands of participants.  Demonstrators carried pro-trade union 
signs and wore red shirts, the official color of the local unions.  All gas stations were 
closed as well as supermarkets and retail businesses.  France deployed 130 riot police 
from mainland France to Martinique on 12 February 2009.  Within a week, however, 
salary increases were already being negotiated, a marked difference in results iithan in 
Guadeloupe.  There are a number of possible reasons for this, one of them being that the 
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Martinican tourism industry was not as willing to concede defeat and shut down as those 
in Guadeloupe did.  Domota surmised that it was possibly unwillingness on the part of 
the employers to deal with the more uncompromising attitude of the Guadeloupeans.  
“They still possess the same mindset,” he said. “For them, it is out of the question that 
Negros [or “Niggers”, depending on the translation] rebel to claim salary increases” 
(Interview with Rosa Moussaoui, L’Humanité 2009b: March 4).   
Back in Guadeloupe, over the course of a month, the protests escalated to 
uprisings, as roadblocks were set up throughout the country, cars and trees were set on 
fire, and the international airport was virtually shut down as debris was thrown on the 
runways, causing American Airlines to cancel all flights.  The protests garnered more 
media attention as people from all sides analyzed the situation.  In an interview with 
BBC, Lawyer Harry Durimel from France’s Green Party bluntly stated his opinion:  
“It’s always the same tactic, all the businessman from the old ancient time 
of slavery, descendant of the slave master they always have the same strategy, 
saying that once the nigger would be hungry they would get back to work.  So 
they have taken the habit of, let the strikes slide and people will get fed up and go 
back to work ... it is a failure of that strategy, the hundreds of gendarmes that have 
just arrived in Guadeloupe who don’t know their law, who don’t know us and 
who are only one thing in mind and is that they go to beat niggers.  They are very 
racist, not people who know Guadeloupe, they are being brought down here for a 
mission and they don’t even understand their mission so we don’t see why they 
don’t use this same force for people who are marching in Paris at the Bastille, 
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why is it that anytime that there is a demand in the colonies that they have to send 
forces, is it a way of dialogue?” 
 
Things took a dramatic turn with the first death associated with strike.  Labor 
union organizer and activist Jacques Bino was shot by a gang of youths not tied to the 
organized protests.  Bino’s murder may have marked a turning point in the general 
strikes, with both the French government and the LKP union groups beginning to take 
serious notice of the conflict.  More than 500 French police officers arrived in 
Guadeloupe on February 19 in an attempt to quell the ongoing violence following Bino’s 
death.  Bino’s funeral was held on Sunday, February 22, 2009.  His funeral was attended 
by former French Socialist presidential candidate Ségolène Royal, who used the solemn 
occasion to criticize the government of French President Nicolas Sarkozy saying the 
government had “abandoned” Guadeloupe and urging it to find “solutions” to the crisis 
(France 24, 2009, February 22).  Following Bino’s death, Victorin Lurel, the president of 
Guadeloupe’s regional council, demanded that the French government stop the violence 
and address underlying tensions.  In response to the riots, President Nicolas Sarkozy 
announced a meeting of the elected leaders of the French overseas territories.  Sarkozy 
held a televised press conference, where he sought to reassure residents that the 
government was not ignoring their concerns, saying “Guadeloupe and Martinique are part 
of France” and that the islands’ residents “have the sentiment that they are not always 
heard. We should continue to fight, every day, so that the country makes a larger place 
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for those who represent the diversity of France” (Turks & Caicos Free Press 2009, 
February 13). 
After a series of negotiations (and cancellation of negotiations), the strikes ended 
on March 4, 2009, when the French government agreed to raise the salaries of the lowest 
paid by 200 euros and granted the LKP their top 20 demands, including the reduction in 
the price of water and food, and the promise to build new, low income housing.   The 
agreement was honorably named the “Jacques Bino Accord”.  The agreement was at first 
only signed by minority employer organizations; the Movement des Entreprises en 
France [The Movement of French Entreprises-MEDEF] refused to sign, and therefore the 
Ministère de l’economie, l’industrie, et de l’emploi [Ministry of economy, industry, and 
employment] had to intervene in order to mandate that the accord be applicable to all 
companies.  Fillon expressed concern that as a result of the employers closing their doors 
for the duration of the strike, that there would be catastrophic consequences for those 
who expected to return to their jobs.  To this, Domota replied in an interview: 
“For 40 years, the unemployment rate is 40% in Guadeloupe.  This has never 
worried the big companies.  Anyhow the MEDEF companies prefer to hire 
elsewhere than in Guadeloupe.  This is the first time that MEDEF has worried 
about the employment situation in Guadeloupe” (Interview with Rosa Moussaoui, 
L’Humanité 2009b: March 4). 
 
The strikes served as an inspiration for Guadeloupeans of the potential for a shift in the 
way things functioned on the island.  Some even described the strikes as a “revolution” 
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(Laventure 2009), proclaiming that “Guadeloupe would never be the same”.  Despite the 
LKP winning a large number of their demands, in the end it is clear that there are deeper, 
more entrenched issues at play that would take more than a 44-day strike to undo.  The 
strikes could not adequately address the divisions among non-white Guadeloupeans.  The 
issue of the “color-line” for example, referring to the relationship between power, 
privilege and one’s skin color, remained untouched.  The mistreatment of Haitian 
migrants, in part due to their perceived hyper-blackness, is a clear example of the other 
issues that need to be addressed.  
 
Race and the Underclass 
 
As marginal as the Guadeloupeans find themselves in the French nation as second-class 
citizens, Haitians bear the brunt of the economic crisis as a culturally inferior, economically 
exploited, and juridically discriminated group on the island.  Although the situation of 
Haitian migration on the island was not on the agenda during the strikes, it is interesting to 
see that the strikes' protest against exploitation did not include the exploitation of 
undocumented Haitian workers who typically perform menial, less-than-desirable jobs for 
very low wages, in the same way Mexican and other immigrants are exploited in the United 
States.  It is certainly a “paradox that Caribbean nationals [i.e., Haitians and Dominicans] 
going to live and work in other Caribbean countries (in this case, Guadeloupe and French 
Guiana) encounter a reception that is just as unfriendly as that accorded to migrants from 
those two countries in Europe or North America” (Giraud 2009: 51). The anti-Haitian 
sentiment in France in particular coincided with the anti-immigrant sentiment of the 1970s 
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and 1980s, when the French government introduced more work permit restrictions in the 
interest of reducing the foreign-born population (Giraud 2009; Hargreaves 1995).  These 
restrictions eventually became the 1993 Pasqua laws that aimed at “zero immigration” 
through tighter border control and changes in who could apply for residency, and even 
denied automatic citizenship to children born in France of immigrant parents (Stovall and 
Van Den Abbeele 2003: 7).  In the Antilles, these laws were taken quite seriously, with 
frequent deportations of Haitians who tried to enter the country or who had over-extended 
their visa (Brodwin 1991; Giraud 2009).   
One of the main reasons Haitians felt outrage over their deportation was that many 
of those deported should have had a right to residency—many had been there for a decade 
or more.  This right had been extended to the East Indian, Syrian, and Lebanese 
population.  Yet Haitians are highly policed and denied access to citizenship rights that 
they are technically due.  Guadeloupeans in general remain unwilling to share their space 
with Haitians.  Are Haitians not victims of extreme exploitation?  Then why was their 
cause not fought for during the strikes?  Giraud argues that the rejection of Haitians by 
Guadeloupeans stems from  “a desire to escape at all costs from what Frantz Fanon called 
‘the great black hole’ of poverty and to get as close as possible to the enviable world of 
the dominant species, the ‘whites’” (Giraud 2009: 51).  He goes on further to say that it is 
a “passion for homogeneity” (citing Haitian sociologist Laennec Hurbon), but primarily tied 
to their identity, based on the desire to be a culturally distinct national group.  Haitians 
living in Guadeloupe do not have much desire to intergrate into French-Guadeloupean life.  
This separatist attitude does not sit well with Guadeloupeans, who thus find Haitians 
suspect and “vulnerable to charges of political disloyalty and economic parasitism” 
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(Brodwin 2001: 5).  
Through the history and current events of Guadeloupe, I argue that Antilleans 
actively reject Haitians as a migrant community because they are also actively rejecting a 
particular kind of Blackness that is linked to inferiority, tradition, and poverty.   
Brodwin offers one informant’s take on the matter:  
He asserts that the assimilation of Guadeloupe into the French nation-state 
outweighs any commonality between the Black residents of Guadeloupe and those 
of Haiti. He thus explains why migrants are humiliated by Guadeloupeans despite 
the two groups’ shared history (former colonial plantation societies with African-
descended populations, speaking similar Creole languages, etc.). A second, even 
more common argument seizes on a lingering ambivalence in Guadeloupeans’ self-
identification as French. It claims that Guadeloupeans actually envy Haitians’ 
cultural autonomy. Guadeloupeans, who always try to imitate the French, are 
intimidated by Haitians’ cultural autonomy and their obvious national pride. 
 
Beriss makes the argument that rather than the category of race being used in discourses 
around Antillean identity, culture and nation are used instead, but more often than not serve 
as fronts in instances when race is really in operation.  I take this argument a step further to 
state that one of the main ways this substitution occurs is through the marrying of  hyper-
Blackness to Haiti. In so doing, Guadeloupeans reveal attitudes that seem to parallel the Us-
Them distinction between Guadeloupeans and white French. Haiti serves two functions in 
the Guadeloupean imagination: 1) as Haiti-the-rebellious-state, its history, particularly its 
brutal revolution that led to independence, makes the country a menacing spectre in 
discussions on Guadeloupean independence, and 2) as Haiti-the-failed-state, with its 
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increasing rate of persistent poverty and marginalization resulting in Haitian migration has 
led to resentment by the Guadeloupean population, who often discriminate against and 
actively seek to deport Haitians.  Where békés represent a racist white oligarchy, Haitians 
represent an undesirable Black population, degrading the quality of life in Guadeloupe, 




It is important to properly contextualize the relationship between Guadeloupe and Haiti, 
to show the continuities as well as the important shifts.  In doing so, I aim to show that 
their present day relationship is deeply connected to complexes that were developed 
during the period of colonization and have persisted—in different manifestations—since.   
As I have stated earlier, the social, political, and economic problems Guadeloupe face are 
a direct consequence of the colonial institution from which it was birthed.  France’s 
desire for an empire led its rulers to colonize territory in all corners of the world.  Guided 
by the conviction that it had reached the apex of civilization, France was driven by the 
desire to spread civilization everywhere it conquered. France began its colonial mission 
in the Caribbean in 1625.  Trying to colonize Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Dominica, 
France decimated the indigenous population of Caribs though expulsion or disease.  The 
Compagnie des Indes occidentales was created in order to manage the plantation 
economies, and bought in a steady stream of Africans and white engagés (indentured 
laborers) from France.  A few decades later, France would acquire the colony of Saint-
Domingue, which would grow to become the most profitable colony of France, earning 
the nickname la Perle des Antilles.  France invested more and more in the economic 
expansion of the Antilles, reaching a significant height in the late 1700s (Dubois 2004a: 
36).   
It was at this point that a number of events occurred that fundamentally altered the 
project of colonization.  The French revolution erupted in 1789, and was a period of 
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political and social unrest that ushered France into a new age of governing.  In the 
attempt to become a modern nation, France rejected absolute monarchism in favor of a 
government where the citizen had a direct relationship to the State.  This was based on 
the principles of republicanism.  French republicanism constitutes an evolution of the 
broader political notion of republicanism that has its origins as far back as 509 BC with 
the establishment of the Roman Republic.  Over time republicanism has evolved, 
branching off into different, contextualized forms as interpreted by, for example, the 
Dutch, the French, or the United States, yet remaining a very Western ideology.  
Enlightenment philosophes and thinkers of the 17th and 18th century shaped French 
republican ideology.  No overarching definition exists, but there are a number of factors 
that are considered its main characteristics.  Republicanism can refer to the political 
system of governing and/or the ideology, ideally being “a community of citizens who 
were expected to practice civic virtue by participating in public life and devoting 
themselves to the common good” (Wilder 2005: 159).  The most basic characteristics of 
republicanism emphasize popular sovereignty, supported by the idea that a people can 
participate fully and rationally in politics, a concept based in Enlightenment and 
Cartesian philosophy.  Furthermore, the principles and values that the nation espouses are 
based on universality, its applicability to all.  French republicanism also encourages the 
use of political institutions in order to promote greater equality and social justice and 
secure a citizen’s liberty and freedom.  Education is of utmost importance in the success 
of French republicanism; in order to create a rational, loyal, and disciplined people who 
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could properly participate in French politics, generation after generation need to be taught 
to be French (Hazareesingh 1994; Conklin 1997). 
  French Republicanism is an ever-evolving concept, and with each Republic 
erected, republicanism became more refined and underwent concrete reform.  (There 
have been no less than five republics, and sub-republics within those.)  Ideologically 
however, republicanism can become much more idealistic, and arguably impossible to 
realize completely (the same could be said for communism or democracy).  Yet 
republicanism as an ideology deeply affected those within the French empire.  
Republicanism represented the height of modernity, the embodiment of Enlightenment 
thought.  In its applicability, however, republicanism was susceptible to corruption by an 
ever-persistent white supremacy that still viewed the African Other as less than human.   
The paradox of the French enlightenment—writing and philosophizing on humanity 
while denying it to enslaved non-Whites—became more pronounced during the French 
revolution.  During the early revolutionary period, everyone had access to French 
citizenship, as historian Patrick Weil explains.  France tried to enact a vision of open 
citizenship: “One could not be a citizen without being French, but during a four-year 
period—from 1790 to 1794—everyone living in France was automatically naturalized as 
French…birth on French territory [was] the principle criterion for possessing the “quality 
of being French” (Weil 2008: 4).  Yet, as Weil conveniently forgets to mention (in a text 
written in 2005, translated in 2008!) a different set of rule existed for the colonies.  
Slavery was still in full force, and France continued to import more and more enslaved 
Africans to work on the Caribbean plantains.  By 1789, the colony of Saint Domingue 
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had 509,642 enslaved Africans, compared to 26,666 freed coloreds and 35,440 white 
colonists (Benot 1987).8  The island of Guadeloupe, in contrast, had 82,978 enslaved 
Africans, 1,877 freed coloreds, and 12,039 white colonists (the numbers for Martinique 
are similar).  It is interesting to see differences in the population distribution: only in 
Saint Domingue did the number of freed coloreds rival that of the white colonists. As the 
enslaved and freed colored population grew, new racial concepts developed that stratified 
the society in ways that corresponded to the global racial hierarchy that placed white men 
in positions of power, freed coloreds in lesser bureaucratic positions, and generally 
disenfranchised those that were interpolated as black.9 Dubois offers a compelling 
example of such racial highlighting from the time period of Guadeloupe’s first 
emancipation in 1790.  It was custom to designate one’s race on legal documentation, 
                                                
8 It is important to note that this number is accurate based on what was reported during 
that time for tax purposes.  Because slave owners had to pay taxes per head, oftentimes 
the actual number of slaves was undercut to avoid higher fees.  See Yves Benot (1987) 
La revolution française et la fin des colonies. Paris: La Découverte. 
9 Dubois in his historical text Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian 
Revolution makes a conscious decision to avoid “using racial designations--white, 
mulatto, black--as categories that can generate explanations rather than as social artifacts 
that demand them...complicated ideological and political forces often divided groups that 
we might be tempted to see as unified by ‘race’” (2004b: 5-6).  Whereas I would agree 
that the use of race could inhibit a nuanced analysis of that historical moment, the total 
avoidance of such categories takes the Haitian revolution out of the larger context of 
global racial formation that shaped and was shaped by the revolution.  The very reason 
for the revolt arose out of the racialized project put forth by French colonizers.  The 
hypocrisy of the French state in declaring its commitment to Republican ideals while 
denying those of who were racialized as Other the full benefit of those rights is precisely 
where race, and specifically Blackness, enter the picture.  Philosophers such as Hegel and 
Gobineau were explicit in their assertion that Black beings were incapable of developing 
an ontology, due their inability to reason and understand conceptions of freedom; rather 
they required enslavement in order to become rational (Buck-Morss 2000; Wright 2004).  
Therefore, certain tenets of a Black consciousness were established during the so-called 
“Age of Revolution”.   
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“white” being the default, unmarked category.  In 1794, local officials began applying the 
racial designation of European—the use of which lasted only two weeks—and blanc 
[white] in a few national legal documents.  Dubois goes on further to describe the various 
nuances and absences of racial designation for gens de couleurs and formerly enslaved 
Africans, concluding,  
“Despite the racial egalitarianism of the 1794 decree of emancipation, the naming 
of race remained of central importance in the French Caribbean…the particular 
ways race was inscribed into the documents in postemancipation Guadeloupe 
differed profoundly from what had come before—and what, in the case of 
Guadeloupe, would come again…The mark of citizenship so powerfully asserted 
in 1797 would ultimately be reversed for these new arrivals baptized into the 
republic” (Dubois in Peabody and Stovall 2003: 105).  
 
Republicanism, despite its universalist tenets, could not ignore race in the Empire.  
The prevalence and increasing influence of the gens de couleurs required that France 
define the terms of political engagement for non-white people.  The enslaved and colonial 
subjects of France were exposed to the ideals of the Enlightenment, yet were deliberately 
denied their civil rights or worse, expression of their full humanity due to their perceived 
incapacity to understand and/or uphold civic duties as a full French citizen. This specific 
argument is what historian Laurent Dubois called “republican racism”, where “new forms 
of racial exclusion became interwoven with the language of the language of rights…that 
initiated a long French engagement with the problem of organizing colonial relationships 
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within a universalist framework” (Dubois 2004b: 167). The struggle for citizenship rights 
for freed coloreds opened up the debates on who could truly be French, and what being 
French meant.  Anti-slavery activists cropped up around the same time, questioning 
whether slavery could still have a legitimate place in the new French republic. In 
mainland France, the group La Société des Amis des Noirs (Society of Friends of 
“Blacks”) was created in support of the abolition movement.  Noted abolitionists such as 
l’abbé Gregoire and l’abbé Raynal were vociferous in their demands for the freeing of 
slaves. Encouraged by their efforts, many free coloreds in Paris demanded that the National 
Assembly live up to its commitment to its Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and 
even demanded spots in the Assembly (Knight and Palmer 1989: 29).     
Of course, these ideas of racial inferiority were based on an investment in slavery 
and colonization as a major source of France’s wealth and power. Although France was 
in possession of some of the most productive colonies in the Caribbean, all of which were 
entirely dependent on their slave population, the country did not tolerate slavery in the 
metropole. The denial of civil and civic rights to the non-white (but mainly enslaved 
African) populations thus did not run counter to Enlightenment principles of universality 
because, “[e]ven as the colonial state presented itself as the bearer of the liberatory 
possibilities of democracy,” writes historian Laurent Dubois, “administrators argued that 
the majority of the colonized did not have the cultural and intellectual capacities 
necessary to responsibly exercise political rights” (Dubois 2004: 4).  Thus, France could 
have laws banning the possession of slaves on the mainland, but allow full-fledged 
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slavery in the Antilles (Ndiaye 2007).10  These contradictions did not go without 
criticism.  More often than not, rather than the flat-out rejection of such policies, the 
enslaved and the elite gens de couleurs sought to “challenge France to extend republican 
institutions to all colonized peoples” (Wilder 2005: 167) and more importantly, highlight 
and critique race—whiteness in particular.   
By creating this distinction of mainland and colonies, it encased continental 
France as the exclusive site of Enlightenment principles put to practice; the colonies were 
sites of the exotic and the uncivilized, and therefore did not have be included in the 
Republican ideology—they were incapable of adhering to its principles.  For example, 
Louis XIV drew up Le Code Noir, a set of 60 laws that were drafted in order to control 
the slave and gens de couleur population, applicable only in the colonies.   The laws 
forbade the practice of any other religion but Roman Catholicism, made it necessary to 
obtain permission in order to for the enslaved to marry, and demanded respect of freed 
coloreds to their former masters.11  Although there were also laws in mainland France 
pertaining to Africans and gens de couleur that prohibited interracial marriage, and 
barred them from entering certain public spaces or carrying weapons (Garrigus 2003), 
such populations still had access to an education or apprenticeship.  This privileging of 
the gens de couleur, however uneven, further solidified the class and color hierarchy 
                                                
10 As historian Pap N’Diaye recounts: “in metropolitan France, slaves were in principle 
not permitted stay since French law stressed their enfranchisement, in light of the 
common law of “free soil” explicitly created by lawmakers in the 16th century….the 
king’s response was…clear: slaves brought to France for one reason or another should be 
liberated…” (2008: 115, my translation). 
11 Translated from original text, as reproduced in “Les 60 articles du Code Noir”, 
accessed July 19, 2009: 
http://www.liceolocarno.ch/Liceo_di_Locarno/materie/biologia/martinica/code_noir.html 
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within white supremacy, but was purposely done in order to co-opt a portion of the 
subjugated population that would in turn act as intermediaries between the French 
government and the disenfranchised (Robinson 2000).  
 
The Rise of the Black Jacobins 
 
The political dissent of those in the metropole was in turn weakening the 
institutions that held the traditional sources of power and authority in the Caribbean in 
check (Knight and Palmer 1989: 26).  Most white French slave-owners were intent on 
keeping their plantation economy in order to maintain their economic and political power 
through the exploitation of African slaves.  This in itself was supported by the writings of 
Enlightenment thinkers.  Some of the popular philosophes included Hume, who had an 
evolutionary idea of history, that declared “all other species of men…to be naturally 
inferior to whites”. There was also Kant, who believed that humans had certain natural 
dispositions and came from a “stem genus”, the white man being closest to the ideal type. 
And most infamously Hegel, who believed non-Europeans to be less human because they 
are not conscious, historical beings, and that furthermore the imperial and colonial 
projects carried out by Europeans were necessary and logical consequences of capitalist 
modernization of society. 
The presence, circulation, and internalization of such racist rhetoric led to the 
white colonists’ demise on the island on Saint Domingue.  Their staunch resistance to 
forming an alliance with the population of gens de couleur (who, oftentimes aligned 
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themselves with those in power and not racially) made it such that the white population 
was isolated and ill-informed as to how to suppress the slave revolts (James 1983, 
Robinson 2000).  Furthermore, the white plantation owners, concerned with the situation 
in France and their futures, were often discussing the revolution within earshot of their 
slaves.  When asked if they weren’t concerned about continuously speaking about liberty 
and equality in front of their slaves, “their passions were too violent.  They ran with their 
weapons for nothing, lynching, assassinating, and mutilating the mulattoes and their 
political enemies; in summary, they showed the slaves the methods for obtaining or 
losing one’s liberty” (James, 1983: 72, my translation).  When the slaves in Saint-
Domingue did indeed revolt, it was  
“the most concrete expression of the idea that the rights proclaimed in France’s 
1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen were indeed universal....the 
slave insurrection of Saint-Domingue led to the expansion of citizenship beyond 
racial barriers despite the massive political and economic investment in the slave 
system at the time” (Dubois 2004b: 3).    
 
On January 1, 1804, the slaves of Saint Domingue, declared Haiti a republic, the first and 
only Black nation to arise out of a successful slave insurrection.  The unfortunate 
outcome of re-enslavement in Guadeloupe is contrasted historically against the successful 
outcome of the St. Domingue rebellions.  With the support of their lesser Antilles 
neighbors, the enslaved Africans in the soon-to-be Haiti waged a violent war with French 
troops, refusing to be denied political sovereignty. The Black Jacobins, as C.L.R. James 
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would call them, learned of the possibilities for freedom arguably through the example of 
the French revolutionaries.  Republicanism, ironically, was a guiding ideology for both 
revolutions.  Yet deviating from an ideal practice of republicanism where racial equality 
(i.e., color-blindness) would exist, the non-white populations held on to those divisions, 
expanding their reach and multiplying the categories.  Caribbeans, due to their history of 
discrimination and enslavement, could not deny the power of racial categories; rather, 
they held on to them as a way to reclaim/re-brand their subjectivity.  The task was 
therefore not to suppress, but to seek empowerment within race-based categories.  This 
empowerment required that “whiteness” be a visible, unneutral category.  In doing so, 
Caribbeans were able to fight not only the French or the “European”, but also the 




Throughout this report I have tried to show examples of the complexity of Antillean 
political identity that vacillates between racial, cultural, and national extremes.  As a 
result of their socio-political inferiority as “subject-citizens”, Guadeloupeans are able to 
enjoy the privileges and rights that come with being French citizens, yet liv[e] in a 
“racially organized colonial society with restrictive labor regulations and diminished 
social legislation under the authoritarian-administrative rule of non-elected French 
governors” (Wilder 2005: 160).  Guadeloupeans are thus able to exhibit a form of 
political agency that is “manifold and formed by a mosaic of subject positions that can be 
both discontinuous and contradictory” (Feldman 1991: 3).  
Guadeloupeans operate in a complicated matrix of relations along the axes 
of race, class, and nationality.  Schnepel lays out a number of these contested 
relationships, including that between békés versus the Black working classes, the 
békés versus the metropole, Guadeloupeans of African descent and those of East 
Indian descent, Guadeloupeans versus metropolitans, a class of the new petit-
bourgeoisie (generally those employed by the government) and those outside of 
this category, Guadeloupean versus Martinicans, and Guadeloupeans versus 
foreign immigrants (especially Haitians) (Schnepel 2004).  
 
A dimension that is present among most of these antagonistic relationships but 
undertheorized is that of the “color line”.  The color line reflects the internalization of the 
racial hierchization that French (and other European/Western conquerors) imposed.  
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Social stratification in Guadeloupe is not only the white békés on top and the black 
masses at the bottom, but also involves the differentiation of color which typically, but 
not always, is related to class.  Trouillot writes,  
“Admittedly, aesthetic evaluations vary according to the socioeconomic class and 
phenotype of those who judge…generally speaking ‘white,’ for example, is not 
considered to be the most pleasing color.  Social evaluations of phenotypes in Haiti 
are nonetheless generally Western dominated and, other things being equal, beyond 
a certain degree of increased melanin, these evaluations imply a denigration of 
blackness” (Trouillot 1998 148). 
 
The color-line, despite its specificities in the Guadeloupean context, is tied to a a global 
racial formation “in which racialization and racism continue to structure social processes 
with devastating material effects and in which political collectivity empowers” (Gordon 
2007: 95).  Racial formation looks at the meaning of race in a given location, and then to 
how those structures are racially organized (Winant 2001: 21).  The particular history of 
Guadeloupe and Martinique with France has shaped a complex relationship to race and to 
the Black diaspora.  Guadeloupean and Martinican struggles with the béké upper class 
and the Haitian underclass is testament to the ongoing struggle of the “denigration of 
blackness”, which is part of a Western discourse on identity formation.  Negritude 
movement sought to challenge this hegemony, yet the essentialist and universalizing 
aspects of Negritude only served to privilege Africa as a universal cultural referent, and 
homogenized the subject.  It furthermore reinforced the binary between subject and 
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history (Dash 1989).  Glissant, on the other hand, preferred to root Caribbean identity in 
the Caribbean, while simultaneously argue for its plurality and multiplicity. 
Inspired by French intellectuals Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Glissant used 
their concept of the rhizome to argue for the heterogeneity of Antillean identity.  “There 
are no points or positions in a rhizome,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “only lines…all 
multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1978).  Building from their theorization of the rhizome, Glissant 
argues that the Antillean identity is “constantly undergoing fragmentation and rupture, 
always spreading out and connecting” (Lewis 2006: 86).  Yet departing from the rootless 
rhizomatic structure as argued by Deleuze and Guattari, Antillean identity is grounded in 
intersecting histories and realities, which is not to say there is a central position, but that 
these intersections form an identity that is in turn is connected to global processes.  
Whereas in Deleuze and Guattari, it is arguable that identities are impossible because 
they require a positioning, Caribbean identity “fixes us in the truth of our existence, it 
forms part of the struggle for self-liberation” (Glissant 1989: 8).  Using this definition, I 
argue that Caribbean identity is well situated for strategies of Black diasporic resistance.   
The Black diaspora is not simply an inherent collectivity of those that are 
“scattered about”, is a site where Black identities are mutually constituted. Glissant’s 
Antillanité is reflected in larger discourses on the Black diaspora.  Stuart Hall’s 
statements on identity can be applied to a complex (and arguably rhizomatic) theorizing 
of diaspora: “cultural identities [read: diasporas] are the points of identification, the 
unstable points of identification or suture, which are made, within the discourses of 
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history and culture.  Not an essence but a positioning” (Hall 1994:395 his emphasis).  For 
Hall, arguably, diasporas (which are a form of cultural identity, after all) are about a 
politics of location, the intersections of history and culture, and the use of both axes in 
order to position one’s self at a given moment in time.  Diasporas are thus fluid concepts, 
“a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’“ (394).  Hall seems to eschew any focus on 
what would be considered “roots”.  In a framework similar to Glissant, Hall de-
essentializes the “origin” of identity:  “this ‘return to the beginning’ is like the imaginary 
in Lacan--it can neither be fulfilled nor requited, and hence is the beginning of the 
symbolic, of representation, the infinitely renewable source of desire, memory, myth, 
search, discovery--in short, the reservoir of our cinematic narratives” (402).  
This brings us back to the overall argument of the fluidity of Antillean identity, 
and its strategic and contextualized deployment.  Despite references to slavery and the 
outright loathing of the béké class, the category of “race” is not central to the Antillean 
identity.  Rather, we must understand how the multiple and intersectional levels of 
interaction come out of historical processes of racialization and are not fixed but 
constantly re-negotiated (Pierre 2009). The subject position of the Antillean contribute to 
discussions and formations of community and subjectivity in the African diaspora.   
For example, there are strides being taken that reflect the presence of a historical 
and political consciousness between the two groups, as postcolonial populations, as 
Caribbeans, but especially as Blacks. For example, during the summer of 2009, Eric 
Domota and fellow Raymond Gama, along with Haitian activist Fignolé St. Cyr (member 
of the Autonomous Confederation of Haitian Workers (CATH) and convener of the Third 
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Caribbean Conference “To Defend Haiti Is to Defend Ourselves!”) organized a 
Guadeloupe-Haiti tour in seven US states.  The tour focused on the strikes in Guadeloupe 
and the UN/US occupation in Haiti, and sought international support for the resistance 
movements in both of those countries.  The men were engaged with not only their 
movements, but in the political resistance movements in the States as well, including the 
Free Mumia Committee of NY and the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement.  The active 
search and support for transnational dialogue shows that the French Antilles are certainly 
not in complete isolation from Black diasporic struggles, but that more effort needs to be 
made for those types of linkages to happen with regularity.    
 At the time of this writing, much of Guadeloupe has remained unchanged.  The 
Antillean strikes did deliver its promise of an extra $200 to low-wage workers’ salaries, 
lower food and gas prices, and some educational reform.  On the whole, however not 
much has changed.  The problems that Guadeloupe has cannot be discussed purely in 
economic terms, because as I hope I have shown, these problems are tied to categories of 
race and nation, which in themselves have been shaped by the colonization, the 
institution of slavery, and more recently, departmentalization.  Guadeloupe must be able 
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